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FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN SPANISH BANKS 
DURING THE PRE-CRISIS PERIOD
This paper presents a descriptive analysis about how financial integration into the Euro zone 
could have affected the business model, capital structure and solvency of Spanish banks. 
Using data from Dealogic and from public reports of Banco de España, the paper explores 
three main changes in the composition of assets and liabilities of Spanish banks during the 
years 1998-2007 that preceded the financial crisis: (i) Spanish banks get funds from 
international financial markets and increasingly substitute deposits for wholesale instruments 
to finance their activity, becoming increasingly dependent on foreign wholesale markets; 
(ii) Spanish banks use the new funding sources to finance the exponential growth of their 
lending activity, especially real-estate loans; (iii) Spanish banks fulfill Basel capital ratios 
loosely, but the weight of core equity capital within regulatory capital decreases in favor 
of hybrid securities at the time that the average risk of the assets in their balance sheet 
increases.
This paper studies structural changes of Spanish banks during the pre-crisis period which 
were possible due to their financial integration into the Euro and foreign financial markets. 
These changes affected banks in different aspects: growth, business model, capital 
structure and solvency. We present descriptive evidence that some of these changes 
reduce the liquidity position and core capital solvency ratios of Spanish banks and increase 
their fragility in front of the financial and economic crisis. 
During the period from 1998 to 2007, financial markets around the globe undergo through 
an impressive development: the volume of assets traded in financial markets increase 
exponentially, enhanced by a surge of financial innovations in the form of new products 
whose functions are not only restricted to raise funds, but to transfer risk, hedge risks or 
arbitrage capital. The dependencies and interconnections among financial markets rise as a 
natural consequence of their development, increasing the degree of financial integration 
among financial markets around the world. 
In Europe, countries have aimed at achieving a higher degree of politic and economic 
integration and one of its main targets is the financial and banking integration of the European 
Union (EU) members. Indeed, the European Central bank (ECB) follows closely this process, 
and it publishes an annual report1 that analyzes a large list of indicators of the degree 
of financial integration among EU members. In the 2012 report, the ECB argues that banking 
and financial integration in the EU is desirable because (i) it strengthens the mechanism 
of transmission of the monetary policy, (ii) it contributes to achieve a higher efficiency in 
the allocation of resources and capital, (iii) contributes to productivity gains that increase 
competition within national markets of member states and (iv) reduces the financial barriers 
among member states and facilitates the access to financial markets, instruments and services. 
In this paper, we provide some evidence that financial integration could have also 
entangled other consequences, in terms of liquidity imbalances and risk exposure, not 
so desirable as those listed above and that Diamond and Rajan (2009) have pointed out 
as the proximate causes of the crisis. More concretely, we explore how the reduction 
of financial barriers among markets, which is in the ECB’s list of the positive contributions 
1 Introduction
1  Annual Report on Financial Integration, ECB.
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of financial integration,2 has turned into a lower level of solvency ratios for Spanish banks.3 
The reasons that we identify in this paper are basically three: First, international markets 
have financed a large part of the high growth of banks focused on real-estate activities. 
The joining of Spain into the European Monetary Union (EMU) grants Spanish banks the 
access to cheap and almost unlimited financing from Euro and foreign markets, which 
absorb more than 70% of the debt instruments that they issue from 1998 to 2007. The 
destination of these funds to finance real-estate loans contributed to enhance the housing 
bubble in Spain, whose worst effects could have been not so devastating (evictions, credit 
crunch, losses of billions of euros,…), provided that banks had rationed their growth policy 
and the recourse to international wholesale financing. 
Second, banks end up with a large dependence on wholesale financing while the importance 
of traditional, more stable sources of funds (i.e., deposits) dwindles in banks’ balance sheets. 
As a consequence, Spanish banks have become directly exposed to the shutdown 
of international financial markets with the outburst of the financial crisis and they have 
undergone through serious liquidity problems due to difficulties to refinance debt instruments 
reaching maturity. Third, Spanish banks’ risk-weighted assets increase as a result of the 
lending expansion and they are obliged to raise fresh regulatory capital in order to comply with 
Basel regulation. It happens that banks choose hybrid capital instruments to cover the main 
bulk of their regulatory capital needs and, hence, the quality of regulatory capital worsenes: the 
core capital (equity and reserves) looses weight in favor of debt-like instruments and, thus, 
the capacity of regulatory capital to absorb loan losses dwindles. This result has been more 
evident when holders of subordinated debt and preferred stock had to share the burden 
of losses, claiming that they bought those securities misguided by banks themselves. The 
experience alerts on the limitations of hybrid regulatory capital instruments as a true loss 
absorbing regulatory capital and it justifies the new core capital standards set by Basel III. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data that is used in the 
paper. Section 3 explores the consequences of financial integration on the banks’ balance 
sheets in terms of assets and liabilities. Section 4 analyzes the change in the composition of 
regulatory capital during the period under study. Section 5 presents the conclusions and 
summarizes the main results of the paper.
This paper gathers information of Spanish banks during the period 1998-2007 from different 
sources of data. The database of issuances of financial instruments has been constructed 
with individual data from Dealogic; the aggregate information from assets and volume of 
credit comes from the Statistical Bulletin of the Banco de España and the regulatory capital 
data has been drawn from the Annual Report on Supervision of the Banco de España
The issuances of financial instruments from Dealogic gather information of all the issuances 
of Spanish banks in financial markets during the period from 1998 to 2007. We do not 
consider later years because in 2008 financial markets stop operating normally for Spanish 
banks. The issuances are classified into two groups, debt issuances and regulatory capital 
issuances, following the criteria of whether the corresponding instrument can absorb 
losses without risking the viability of the bank. Under this notion of capital, ordinary shares, 
convertible debt, preferred shares and subordinated debt have the capacity of absorbing 
2 Data
2  The list of positive contribution can be found in Chapter IIA “The benefits of the EU’s single financial market 
revisited in the light of the crisis” of the report Financial Integration in Europe, April 2012, European Central Bank.
3  Martín-Oliver, Ruano and Salas-Fumás (2012) analyze the impact of financial integration on the productivity of 
Spanish banks. They show that around 2/3 of the productivity gains were attributed to change of the business 
model of Spanish banks during the pre-crisis period.
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losses because it is the ultimate stakeholder the one that assumes the loss of value. On the 
other hand, we group the issuances of senior debt, covered bonds and securitization as 
debt issuances because their value and proceeds do absorb losses of the bank only in the 
event of severe instability and bankruptcy. This is one of the two notions of capital in Acharya 
et al. (2011) that coincides with the list of eligible capital of Basel I and II. 
The section that analyzes the evolution of the asset side of banks is based on aggregate 
data of assets and the balance of credit by categories published in the Statistical Bulletin 
of the Banco de España during the period from 1998 to 2011. Here we extend the sample 
period to the latest year available to analyze the change in the composition of assets as a 
result of the crisis. Further, the analysis of regulatory capital uses data from the annual Report 
on Banking Supervision in Spain by the Banco de España for the variables risk-weighted 
assets (RWA), total regulatory capital and core regulatory capital of all Spanish banks, also 
during the period 1998-2011.
The traditional activity of a bank is the intermediation between investors and savers, that 
is, the collection of funds from the savers of an economy, with short- and medium-term 
inter-temporal consumption preferences, and the transformation into loans of different 
maturity that match the needs of the investors of that economy. In traditional banking, 
deposits constitute the basic source of funding of banks’ lending activity. This is the business 
model of the Spanish banking industry until the end of the 90s: Chart 1 shows that during 
those years, the average composition of the liability side is made up of 84% deposits and 
around 11% own funds (capital, reserves and accumulated loans loss provisions). Only a 
marginal 5% of the banks’ balance sheet is financed with debt instruments, thus, banks do 
not consider debt as a close substitute of deposits prior 2000. However, during the next 
years the traditional intermediation model begins to fade: Chart 1 shows that the weight of 
deposits decreases from 84.28% in 1998 to 59.11% in 2006 in favor of debt (from 3.67% in 
1998 to 12.34% in 2006) and, specially, securitization4 (from 1.54% in 1998 to 19.84% 
in 2006). Banks no longer base their growth and financing only on deposits because they 
can access to alternative sources to finance their banking activity. 
The explanation of this breaking point, from which debt and securitization become a real 
alternative to banks’ deposits, can be located around the introduction of Spain in the EMU 
and the consequent access of banks to the European and international capital markets. 
3  The evolution of banks’ 
balance sheets with 
financial integration
3.1  FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
THE LEVERAGING PROCESS 
OF SPANISH BANKS
SOURCE: Almazán, Martín-Oliver and Saurina (2013), mimeo.
CHART 1 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
DEPOSITS DEBT OWNFUNDS SECURIT 
CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITIONOF LIABILITIES. SPANISH BANKS 
% 
4 Almazán, Martín-Oliver and Saurina include covered bonds in their definition of securitization and so do we in the 
comments of Figure 1, following the source of reference.
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The access to new sources of funding is accompanied with the fall of the cost of funds, in 
part because of the translation of the lowering Spanish sovereign risk premium to the 
funding cost of Spanish firms. Additionally, the huge increase in the volume of assets 
traded in global markets, enhanced by financial engineering, also contributes to explain 
the exponential raise of wholesale financing of Spanish banks. 
Chart 2 provides evidence of the importance of international markets in the issuances of 
debt of Spanish banks during the period 1998-2007: Euro and foreign markets concentrated 
more than 60% of the total issuances (versus less than 40% from domestic market), 
except in 2006 when the volume amounted to 53.4%. Adding up the volumes of all the 
years under study, the issuances in euro and foreign markets amounts to 71.12%. In 
absolute values, Chart 3 illustrates that the issuances of debt-like instruments increases 
exponentially during the 2000s, consistent with the increasing weight of debt and 
securitization observed in Chart 1. Comparing the beginning and the end of the period 
analyzed, the volume of total debt-like instruments issued in 2007 is multiplied by a factor 
of 18 compared to 1998; the highest contributor to this growth is securitization. 
The high surge of securitization in Spain, especially from 2005 to 2007, coincides with the 
high demand from financial markets towards this type of products, as well as with other 
factors that contributed to its growth (i.e., growth of bank credit, housing bubble,…). During 
these years, financial engineering generates a wide range of financial products related to 
SOURCE: Dealogic and own elaboration.
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securitization, risk transfer and tranching and markets are eager to absorb large volumes of 
these instruments issued by banks around the globe. Part of this interest is justified by the 
low-risk perception that investors have towards securitization bonds because they are backed 
by an a priori diversified loan portfolio and credit agencies rate the main part of the issuance 
with top grades. During the period analyzed, Spanish banks realize that securitization 
represents an opportunity to obtain funds at costs at least as low as other alternatives, since 
some tranches could have even better ratings than the senior debt of the issuer. 
Compared to traditional deposits, securitization has the advantage that banks do not have 
to compete with other banks to collect funds in branches because there is a large demand 
willing to buy both the issuances of a particular bank and those from the competitors’. As 
well as this, securitization represents a gate to enter international financial markets for 
small- and medium-size banks. These banks did not have the opportunity to issue 
securities in wholesale markets due to asymmetric information problems [Almazán et al. 
(2013)], but thanks to financial innovation they could issue asset back securities (ABS) 
bonds that the markets were eager to buy at a cost similar to that of big, well-known 
banks. The strategy is that a group of banks, usually from different regions of Spain, put in 
common mortgages and real-estate loans from their balance sheet and issue securitized 
bonds backed by this common portfolio. In this way, markets understand that the 
geographical risk of loans granted by a single regional bank is diversified with the rest of 
loans backing the issuance. Thereby, small and medium banks could also become less 
dependent of the traditional deposits to fund their lending activity.
As said, the increasing recourse to securitization and debt is translated into a higher weight 
of wholesale funding in banks ’balance sheet, whereas deposits become less important to 
finance banks’ activities. A positive consequence is that Spanish banks no longer depend 
on the collection of deposits to finance loans and projects with positive net present value. 
The drawback is that Spanish banks become more dependent on wholesale funding to 
refinance debt issuances reaching maturity and to the conditions of foreign markets, given 
that 71.12% of the total volume have been issued in non-domestic markets. Deposits 
might limit the capacity to growth, but they constitute a sounder and more stable source 
of funds not so dependent on external factors of the bank. With the outburst of the crisis 
in 2008, international markets shut down and banks around the globe have difficulties to 
refinance debt. For Spanish banks, the situation becomes even worse because the Euro 
sovereign crisis makes the access to foreign refinancing even more difficult, aggravating 
their liquidity problems. The only exit for Spanish banks during these years has been the 
recourse to the ECB that has provided the liquidity that financial markets do not grant. 
Summing up, financial integration allowed Spanish banks to access sources of funds 
alternative to deposits from international financial markets. However, they have become 
structurally dependent on the conditions affecting international wholesale markets. The 
outburst of the crisis has entangled liquidity problems for Spanish banks due to difficulties 
to refinance past debt issuances. A more limited recourse to foreign wholesale funding 
during the pre-crisis period could have limited the liquidity problems faced by Spanish 
banks during the crisis. 
In this section we comment that the real-estate bubble that burst during the economic 
crisis is in part a consequence of financial integration. The access to international financial 
markets allows Spanish banks to finance the high credit growth rates in their balance 
sheets concentrated on the lending to the real-estate sector, something recurrent in the 
idiosyncrasy of Spanish crisis over time. 
3.2  THE USE OF THE 
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
IN THE ASSET SIDE
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Chart 4 shows that total assets of Spanish banks increase at a constant rate of around 10% 
during the pre-euro years. After the entrance of Spain in the EMU (especially from 2003, 
coinciding with the largest debt issuances in international markets) the slope of total assets 
becomes steeper and the average growth rates amount to 13.84%, peaking in 2005 with a 
growth rate of 24.9%. If we analyze the evolution of the lending activity in Chart 5.1 and Chart 
5.2, we also observe that the growth rates soar during the years of higher increase of wholesale 
financing. The yearly average growth rate of banks’ loans to the private sector amounts to 
16.67% during the Euro period from 2000 to 2007, a figure that results from the growth of 
mortgages (18.42%) and, especially, loans to real-estate firms (25.91%). These high figures 
contrast with the more modest growth rates of the previous years: during the (pre-euro) period 
1992-1999, the yearly average growth rate of loans to private sector, real-estate firms and 
mortgages amounts to 5.95%, 5.96% and 2.59%, respectively. 
During the expansion years preceding the crisis, the Banco de España repeatedly warns 
banks of the potential risks embedded in their strategy of excessive loan growth and 
concentration in real-estate sector5 (i.e., reduction of lending standards, enhancement of 
housing bubble, etc). This happens while banks’ credit indicators give a very different and 
more positive view of the situation: non-performing loans (NPL) ratios are around 1% 
(Chart 5.3) and that of real-estate firms amounts to 0.37% in 2006, one of the lowest ratios 
in these series. It is the outburst of the global crisis and the deterioration of the Spanish 
economy what uncovers the unbalances of the previous period: loans begin to default and 
NPL ratios start an increasing trend that beat previous historic peaks of the series, 
especially in the case of real-estate firms whose NPL ratio amounted to 20.63% in 2011. 
The deterioration of the loan portfolio has resulted in billions of losses, public capital 
injections, bailouts and the restructuring of the whole Spanish banking sector, still under 
way in 2013.
To a large extend, the almost inelastic demand of international markets for bonds issued 
by Spanish banks has enhanced the growing housing bubble financed by Spanish banks. 
Back to Charts 2 and 3, we have inferred that if Spanish banks had not had access to 
international markets they could only have raised 28.88% of the total volume issued during 
the years 2000-2007. This does not mean that raising funds from foreign markets is 
negative and/or should be controlled. Rather, we claim that the fact of banks not having a 
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de España.
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limited amount of resources that obliged them to screen and select across potential 
borrowers probably resulted in incentives to lower credit standards and expand their 
business granting risky loans. 
This section studies how the structural changes of Spanish banks during the pre-crisis 
period which are possible due to financial integration are also related with changes in the 
quantity and quality of banks ’capital. During the period under study, Spanish banks have to 
fulfill the regulatory capital requirements set by the Basel Accord in 8% of the risk-weighted 
4  Financial integration 
and the quality 
of capital
SOURCE: Almazán, Martín-Oliver and Saurina (2013), mimeo.
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assets (RWA). The growth in volume of assets (Section 3) is parallel to a higher risk embedded 
in the granted loans and, thus, the level of RWA increases during the period under study. 
Banks could have responded either by absorbing the higher RWA with the buffer of 
regulatory capital accumulated during previous years (with a reduction of the Basel capital 
ratio), or they could have offset the rise in RWA by increasing the volume of regulatory 
capital (numerator of the regulatory capital ratio). Chart 6 shows that Spanish banks opt 
for the second option. The level of regulatory capital remains constant over time around 
values quite above the regulatory minimum: both the average of the population of banks 
and the median of the distribution of regulatory capital remain stable around 12% during 
the whole sample period. The simple average of the Basel ratio across banks decreases 
from 16% to levels around 14%, which in part can be explained by the reduction of the 
buffer held by banks in the highest percentiles. 
Therefore, the coefficient of regulatory capital does not decrease due to the growth of its 
denominator; rather it remains well above the level of the regulatory minimum obliged by 
Basel I. To do so, they need to raise fresh regulatory capital.6 Chart 7 shows that banks 
issue instruments computing as regulatory capital, amounting to 8.91% of the total 
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issuances during the period 1998-2007. Again, Chart 8 shows this has been possible due 
to the access of Spanish banks into the international financial markets. More concretely, 
the percentage of capital issuances in international markets amounted to 79.1% from 
1998 to 2007, a proportion even higher than that of debt instruments, 71.4%
So far, we have shown that, in terms of the amount of regulatory capital, banks’ solvency has 
not been affected by banks’ growth. Now we turn our attention to the composition of 
regulatory capital during this time period and study. Recent papers provide descriptive 
evidence of a deterioration of bank capital in US banks prior and during the crisis that reduces 
the capacity of capital to act as a corporate governance mechanism, since the participation of 
owners in potential losses has become smaller [Acharya et al. (2009) and  Mehran, Morrison 
and Shapiro (2011)]. According to Acharya, Gujral, Kulkarni and Shin (2011) this dwindling 
weight of common capital could also explain the difficulties of banks to raise new funds, 
since creditors will only lend if common shareholders are bearing a significant part of the risk. 
We study whether this has been the case for Spanish banks and the high ratio of the Basel 
coefficient is hiding a deterioration of the quality of regulatory capital.
First, we study the evolution of the common capital, defined as the sum of capital and 
reserves (core capital), which is the capital of highest quality to absorb losses. Chart 9 
shows that the capital ratio of the banking system has decreased from its peak of 6.81% 
in 2000 to 5.59% in 2007, implying a reduction of 1.22 percentage points of the weight of 
ISSUANCE OF DEBT AND CAPITAL, BY MARKET TYPE CHART 8
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 DOMESTIC  EURO, FOREIGN, GLOBAL 
  
DEBT INSTRUMENTS 
%  
SOURCE: Own elaboration with Dealogic. 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 DOMESTIC  EURO, FOREIGN, GLOBAL 
  
CAPITAL INSTRUMENTS 
%  
CAPITAL RATIO OF SPANISH BANKS CHART 9
4.0  
4.5  
5.0  
5.5  
6.0  
6.5  
7.0  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
  
  % 
SOURCES: Banco de España, Boletín Estadístico, and own elaboration.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 120 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 24
core capital with respect to total assets. Even though the accounting capital ratio does 
not adjust by risk measures, we appreciate a fall of the weight of top-quality capital in the 
balance sheet of Spanish banks. We find that the main cause of the decreasing trend 
of the equity capital ratio is that the issuances of regulatory capital are mainly in form of 
hybrid capital, that is, preferred shares and subordinated debt. 
Basel I and II consider preferred shares as a component of Tier 1 capital, within certain 
limits, and Spanish banks use them to fulfill regulation taking advantage of their benefits 
as a debt-like instrument (i.e., tax-deductible interest rates, lower cost of capital). 
Nonetheless, the recent financial crisis has shown, especially in the Spanish case, that 
preferred shares are not as good as equity to absorb losses. To analyze capital deterioration, 
we take the current criterion of Basel III that does not include preferred shares in the list of 
capital instruments that compute as core Tier 1 capital, and we consider them as hybrid 
instruments in the same terms as subordinated debt.
Chart 10 shows the composition of the capital issuances of Spanish banks during the 
sample period, differentiating between hybrid capital and equity and convertible bonds. 
For all the years, hybrid capital represents more than 50% of the total issuances of 
regulatory capital and, for the whole period, the average proportion (dashed line) amounts 
to 71.5%. That is, banks manage their regulatory capital ratios to maintain the levels 
above the regulatory minimum, but the strategy consists on issuing only 3 units of core 
capital out of 10 units issued of regulatory capital instruments. In doing so, banks are 
taking advantage, on the one hand, of the high demand of international markets during 
the pre-crisis years and, on the other hand, of the advantages of the debt-like capital 
instruments that compute as regulatory capital, both Tier 1 (preferred shares) and Tier 2 
(subordinated debt). As a result, the quality of capital deteriorates and looses capacity to 
absorb looses.
So far, we have seen that banks issue hybrid capital to maintain the regulatory capital ratio 
constant and this action results in a decreasing trend of the accounting capital ratio. Now, 
we decompose the regulatory capital ratio into three components to understand how this 
ratio was kept constant at the same time that the equity capital ratio decreased:
Decomposition of the 
regulatory capital
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The first ratio, , is the inverse of the weight of the core capital within
the regulatory capital. The definition of core capital has been constructed with data of the 
regulatory statements drawn from the annual Report on Banking Supervision in Spain and, 
thus, it does not coincide with the accounting concepts of capital and reserves used in 
Chart 9. Here, we define core capital as the Tier 1 capital once we remove the preferred 
shares7 and the part of the deductions from Tier 1 and Tier 2 funds that corresponds to 
original own funds.8 The second ratio, , informs of the weight of the core 
capital computed with regulatory statements with respect to accounting assets. As said, 
this ratio is not the same than the ratio presented in Chart 9 because there we only 
used accounting data. Next, the third ratio is equal to the total accounting assets 
divided by the risk-weighted assets of  Spanish banks and it informs of the evolution of the 
risks of the banks’ assets. 
Chart 11 shows the flat trend of the regulatory capital ratio occurs at the same time that 
there are time variations of different sign in each of its components that compensate each 
other. The time evolution of confirms the negative trend of the core capitalwith 
respect to assets observed in Chart 9 from accounting data; here the ratio decreases 0.5 
percentage points, from 3.58% in 1998 to 4.06% in 2007. More importantly, we observe 
that the weight of core capital also decreases in terms of total regulatory capital (the ratio
increases over time) and by 2007 it has fallen to 85% of its value in
 
1998. These Figures confirm that regulatory capital in Spanish banks has deteriorated as 
in US banks, [Acharya et al. (2011), Acharya et al. (2009) and Mehran et al. (2011)]. Thus, 
the higher proportion of hybrid capital in banks’ capital is not compensated with retained 
earnings or other sources of common capital. On the contrary, banks are substituting core 
capital with hybrid capital, probably because it has a lower cost and, thus, profits increase.
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Further, the weight of core capital dwindles at the same time that the risk of the banks’ 
assets increases, since shows a decreasing trend in Chart 11. In 2007, the 
average risk per unit of asset has increased in 12.85% with respect that of 1998, according 
to the Basel I methodology to compute risk-weighted assets. This implies that the quality 
of the regulatory capital to absorb losses is worsening at the same time that the assets of 
the banks become riskier; Chart 12 shows that the ratio of core capital with respect to risk-
weighted assets decreases from 7.19% in 1998 to 5.66% in 2007.
Summing up, during the years previous to the crisis, the quality of regulatory capital of 
Spanish banks deteriorates as the weight of core capital decreases in favor of debt-like 
instruments, which computed as Tier 2 and Tier 1 (up to a limit) under Basel I and II. The 
consequences have been the lower capacity of regulatory capital to absorb the loan losses 
arisen during the crisis and the higher difficulty of Spanish banks to obtain external funding 
in international markets since the beginning of the crisis. 
The entrance of Spain into the EMU has been a breaking point in the financial structure 
and lending activities of Spanish banks. Funds are no longer limited to domestic deposits 
because banks can issue debt instruments at low cost that attract international investors. 
Adding up all the issuances of debt-like instruments, the funds obtained from international 
markets represent the 71.12% of the total issuances of Spanish banks from 2000 to 2007. 
A great deal of the large volume of issuances responds to the enrollment of Spanish banks 
in the list of entities issuing tranched products related to securitization; by 2007 they 
become the second largest issuer of ABS in Europe, after British banks. At the same time, 
real-estate prices increase at exponential rates due to the combination of the higher 
economic value of the generated rents, discounted at lower interest rates, and the unlimited 
supply of credit granted to firms and households. 
There are sound arguments about the potential benefits of financial integration, but the 
recent experience of Spanish banks alerts about potential social costs that should be 
taken into account as lessons for the future: (i) wholesale funding of loans creates a liquidity 
gap that increases the exposure of banks to the business cycle and poses systemic risks, 
especially when these funds are channeled towards long-term maturity assets such as 
real-estate assets; (ii) the situation is aggravated by the fact that the providers of funds are 
international wholesale markets where investors have strong pressures of short-term 
financial returns; (iii) the expansion of the assets and liabilities of Spanish banks takes 
place under a capital regulation that keeps the minimum of equity-core capital at low levels 
5 Conclusion
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and gives a lot of room for meeting the capital requirements with debt-like instruments. 
The experience has proved that the loss-absorption capacity of these hybrids is smaller 
than anticipated, which contributes to explain the solvency problems faced by Spanish 
banks during the crisis. As well as this, the low ratio of equity capital fuels the liquidity gap 
because creditors only lend if common shareholders bear a significant part of the risk 
[Acharya et al. (2011)]. The revealed superior quality of equity capital justifies the stricter 
definition of core Tier 1 capital included in Basel III. 
The structural dependence on international wholesale markets, built during the period 
2000-2007, has resulted in liquidity problems with the outburst of the crisis and in the 
stagnation of the bank credit and the economy activity. Though we are not blaming financial 
integration for this situation, we claim that during the period of high growth preceding the 
crisis, financial integration is not backed by mechanisms of crisis resolution in concordance 
with the potential liquidity and solvency problems that are being generated. The end of 
the story about the banking crisis in Spain has not been written yet. Meanwhile, the 
restructuring process has entangled the reduction of the number of banks operating in Spain 
through mergers and acquisitions, the conversion of savings banks into commercial banks, 
the bailout of banks, the injection of public capital in banks, the revision of the mechanisms 
of supervision of the Bank of Spain, the creation of a “bad bank” to absorb toxic assets and 
the drastic reduction of the number of branches and workers, among others.
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